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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant Stephen Adamson concurs with the State's jurisdictional 
statement. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether Troopers McCoy and Spillman 
impermissibly exceeded the scope of a traffic stop for minor traffic and equipment 
violations when they determined to conduct an independent DUI investigation 
based only on their discovery that Mr. Adamson had a criminal record, including 
two prior DUI convictions,,and was an alcohol-restricted driver required to have 
an ignition interlock device installed on his vehicle. 
Mr. Adamson concurs with the State's statement of the appropriate 
standard of review. With one exception, which will be discussed in the course of 
argument, see infra note 6, Mr. Adamson concurs with the State's assertion that 
the issue was preserved below. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Mr. Adamson relies upon the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Adamson generally concurs with the State's statement of the case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 19, 2008, a snowy night, Troopers McCoy and Spillman, 
while on patrol, "were trying to find someone that was driving impaired so that 
[Trooper McCoy] could have the experience of field sobriety tests and arresting 
an impaired driver." (R. 77; 104; 139:14, 27.) At approximately 10:30 pm, they 
initiated a traffic stop of Mr. Adamson's vehicle for two reasons: First, Mr. 
Adamson, while approaching an intersection at 3300 South and 350 West in Salt 
Lake City, drove partially in the left turn lane before drifting back into his own lane 
and proceeding through the intersection. And second, Mr. Adamson's rear 
license plate light was burnt out. (R. 77; 104; 139:14.) 
Trooper McCoy approached Mr. Adamson's vehicle and asked Mr. 
Adamson to produce his license and registration. (R. 77; 104; 139:10.) He also 
asked Mr. Adamson if he had been drinking. (R. 77; 104; 139:6.)1 Mr. Adamson 
1
 In its brief, the State asserts that no evidence supports this finding. (See 
Appellant's Br. 4 n.2.) On the contrary, the trial court viewed the dashcam video 
as part of the evidence presented during the suppression hearing. (R. 139:6.) 
The dashcam video was an important piece of evidence that the trial court 
considered and from which it made many of its findings, which were included in 
its April 16, 2010 memorandum decision and order (R. 77-86) and its final 
findings (R. 103-110). 
The State also suggests that the trial court's findings are exaggerated with 
respect to the troopers' admissions that they lacked reasonable suspicion of any 
criminal conduct that would justify commencing a DUI investigation. (See 
Appellant's Br. 21 n.5.) But these conclusions are well-supported by the 
testimony. (See R. 78; 83-84; 105-106; 139:31, 32.) 
In any event, in order to challenge any of the trial court's findings, the State 
must marshal the evidence. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, fl 12, 164 P.3d 
397 ("[PJarties challenging the facts under a clear error standard have a judicially 
2 
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told Trooper McCoy that he had not been drinking and gave the trooper his 
identification card and registration. (R. 78; 104; 139:6, 10.)2 Trooper McCoy 
then went back to his vehicle. (R. 104; 139:10, 17.) 
When he returned to the vehicle, Trooper McCoy immediately told his 
trainer, Trooper Spillman, that he had not smelled any odor of alcohol when he 
approached the vehicle and spoke with Mr. Adamson. (R. 78; 104; 139:10, 17.) 
He also told Trooper Spillman that Mr. Adamson had denied drinking any alcohol. 
(R. 139:6.)3 Apparently satisfied that no crime beyond the minor traffic violations 
had occurred, he and Trooper Spillman then began to run computer checks on 
Mr. Adamson and his vehicle. (R. 78; 105; 139:10-11, 17-18, 27-28.) 
As a result of their computer checks, the troopers determined that Mr. 
Adamson had a valid driver's license and no warrants. (Id.) They also 
discovered, however, that Mr. Adamson had two prior convictions for DUI and 
was an alcohol-restricted driver with an ignition interlock device requirement. 
(Id.) On that basis, and immediately after the troopers discovered Mr. 
Adamson's criminal history and restriction, Trooper Spillman instructed Trooper 
imposed obligation to marshal the evidence in support of the challenged 
finding."). If it fails to do so, "the trial court's findings must be considered true." 
Id. 
2
 See supra note 1. 
3
 This fact is further evidenced on the dashcam video that was shown to the trial 
court. (R. 139:6.) 
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McCoy to go back to the vehicle and conduct field sobriety tests. (R. 139:6, 18, 
29.) Specifically, Trooper Spillman suggested that Trooper McCoy conduct a 
nystagmus test and "PBT him." (Id.)4 As an afterthought, he suggested that 
Trooper McCoy also verify that Mr. Adamson was driving with an ignition 
interlock device in place. (Id.)5 Trooper Spillman saw an opportunity for further 
investigation, "especially from a training perspective." (R. 139:28.) 
Before completing any other paperwork or issuing any citation to Mr. 
Adamson, Trooper McCoy immediately exited his patrol car, approached Mr. 
Adamson's vehicle, and inquired of him whether an ignition interlock device was 
installed. (R. 78; 105; 139:12, 18, 29.) It was. (R. 139:12.) At some point 
during Trooper McCoy's new investigation, he smelled the odor of alcohol. (R. 
78; 105; 139:12-13,18.) Trooper McCoy then ordered Mr. Adamson out of the 
vehicle so that he could conduct field sobriety tests. (R. 78; 105; 139:12, 18, 29.) 
Trooper Spillman testified at the suppression hearing that he and Trooper 
McCoy could have terminated the traffic stop and issued a citation before they 
proceeded with their "further investigation." (R. 106; 139:30.) After all, they had 
already determined that Mr. Adamson had a valid driver's license, and Trooper 
McCoy had not detected any signs of impairment. (R. 78; 105; 139:32.) Trooper 
Spillman admitted that "there was no articulable suspicion that either one of 
4
 See supra note 3. 
5
 See supra note 3. 
4 
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[them] had to pull [Mr. Adamson] out of the car other than the fact [they] had run 
a records check that showed that he was alcohol restricted, that he was required 
to have an ignition interlock and that he had prior Dill's." (R. 83-84; 106; 
139:32.) Trooper Spillman also admitted that they "had no articulable suspicion 
of any alcohol consumption." (R. 83-84; 106; 139:32-33.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case turns on the application of the principle that, whether to justify 
initiating a traffic stop or expanding the scope of the stop once initiated, law 
enforcement officers must be aware of facts which give them a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. There is no question here that Troopers 
McCoy and Spillman were justified in initiating a traffic stop: On a snowy night, 
Mr. Adamson briefly drove outside his lane and his license plate light was burnt 
out. But, based on their own sworn testimony, Troopers McCoy and Spillman 
commenced a separate DUI investigation based solely on their discovery of Mr. 
Adamson's criminal history and license restrictions. Neither his license 
restrictions nor his criminal history, however, amount to a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity that justified the troopers in expanding the scope of 
their investigation. 
ARGUMENT 
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens 
from unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 868 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also U.S. Const, amend. IV. "To determine whether a 
search or a seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we must first determine whether 
the officer's action was justified at its inception. If so, we then consider whether the 
resulting detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,450 
(Utah 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "With respect to the 
first facet of this analysis, it is settled that a police officer may detain and question an 
individual when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has 
been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). With respect to the second, it is equally well settled that "once a stop is 
made, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Generally, an officer may further detain an individual only if, during the course of the 
[initial] stop, the officer discovers acts which give him or her reasonable suspicion of 
other more serious criminal activity." Bradford, 839 P.2d at 869 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, any "[ijnvestigative questioning that further detains the driver must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." State v. 
Lafond, 2003 UT App 101, If 13, 68 P.3d 1043. 
I. Troopers McCoy and Spillman exceeded the scope of the initial detention 
when they began a separate DUI investigation. 
Here, there is no question that the stop was initially justified. The troopers 
allege that Mr. Adamson briefly traveled outside of his marked lane and that his rear 
6 
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license plate light was burnt out. "[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may 
request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and 
issue a citation." Id. The troopers began to do just that, but decided to terminate 
their issuance of a citation in favor of engaging in a fishing expedition based on 
nothing but the fact that Mr. Adamson had a driver license restriction and a criminal 
history that included two prior DUI convictions. Under such circumstances, Trooper 
McCoy's investigative questioning about the presence of an ignition interlock device 
went well beyond the scope of the initial stop and was, in a word, unreasonable. 
11. Troopers McCoy and Spillman did not have any reasonable, articulable 
suspicion of any criminal activity. 
The legal requirements for initiating a traffic stop and expanding the scope of 
that stop are the same: In either case, an officer must have "reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." 
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Criminal history 
alone is insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion to shift the 
focus of a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity." State v. Dennis, 2007 
UT App 266, If 12,167 P.3d 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). Beyond the 
minor traffic and equipment violations that justified the initial stop, the troopers did not 
discover any evidence or facts before commencing their separate DUI investigation 
that suggested that Mr. Adamson had violated any law. 
Trooper McCoy did not detect any odor of alcohol or any signs of impairment 
when he first made contact with Mr. Adamson. Trooper Spillman further testified 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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under oath that, when the troopers decided to expand their investigation, there was 
no reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Adamson had even consumed any 
alcohol. This is especially important, because in the absence of evidence of either 
consumption or impairment, there could be no reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. In other words, the existence of a license restriction does not equate to 
criminal conduct. 
The State suggests that it is appropriate to investigate—that is, to "verify 
compliance"—whenever a driver is alcohol-restricted or is subject to an ignition 
interlock device requirement. For the first time on appeal,6 the State relies upon 
State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41,107 P.3d 706, United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 
942 (10th Cir. 1997), and Delaware v. Prouse, 40 U.S. 648 (1979), to support its 
argument. But none of these cases stands for the State's proposition. 
6
 Although the State attempted to make this argument to the trial court below, it 
did not provide any legal authority or support for it. It simply asserted, without 
support, that the posting of an ignition interlock restriction on a driver's driving 
record would be "nonsensical" if police officers were not allowed to verify a 
driver's compliance with that requirement, suggesting that "the legislature 
intended officers to investigate further to verify that a driver is complying with 
these mandatory restrictions." (R. 49.) Having failed to supply any legal support 
or authority for its argument below, the State waived its argument and may not 
now attempt to justify it on appeal. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 
72, fl 51, 99 P.3d 801 (noting that a party is required to preserve an issue by 
presenting it "to the trial court in such a way that the trial court ha[d] an 
opportunity to rule on that issue" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. 
("For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct [an] error (1) the issue 
must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raisedf,] 
and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority" (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
8 
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In dicta, the Chism court explained simply that the reason for allowing 
computer checks on driver's licenses was to "confirm" and/or "verify [the driver's] 
continuing driving privileges" and "to determine whether the status of [the driver's] 
driving privileges has changed since the issuance of the license." 2005 UT App 41, 
fl 15 & n.7. It further explained, again in dicta, that "computer checks to confirm 
driving privileges during traffic stops are justified in large part because driving 
privileges can be revoked. Revocation is not reflected on the physical driver license 
presented to an officer by a driver." /cf. H17 n.1.0. Through this dicta, Chism simply 
establishes the propriety of computer checks to verify continuing driving privileges— 
or in other words, to check the continuing validity of a driver's license. It does not 
justify expanded investigations based on those computer checks to dispel unfounded 
concerns that a driver might not be complying with the restrictions of his license. 
Wood stands simply for the proposition, quoted in the State's brief, that during 
a traffic stop, "a police officer is permitted to ask such questions . . . as necessary to 
determine that the driver has a valid license and is entitled to operate the vehicle." 
106 F.3d at 945. As in Chism, Wood simply justifies an officer in confirming the 
continuing validity of a driver's license. 
The court in Prouse explained that police officers may "check [a] driver's 
license . . . in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that 
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure /or violation of law." 
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40 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added). Prouse, then, is consistent with the well-
established principle that both an initial detention and any expansion of its scope 
must be based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. 
To be sure, it would be appropriate for officers, as part of a DUI 
investigation supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion, to verify a suspect 
driver's compliance with an ignition interlock restriction. But the legislature could 
not have intended and does not have the power to give police officers authority to 
conduct investigations where, as here, there is no reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to justify the investigation in the first place. 
The fact that a person is subject to license restrictions does not amount to 
reasonable suspicion that the person is violating them. Because there is no 
difference between the reasonable suspicion required to justify an initial stop and the 
reasonable suspicion required to expand the scope of that stop, the State's position 
taken to its logical conclusion would justify officers in initiating a stop anytime they 
determined that a driver was subject to license restrictions simply to verify the 
driver's compliance with those restrictions. If that were the law, the Fourth 
Amendment would have little meaning, and "any person with any sort of criminal 
record [or interlock requirement]... could [then] be subjected to a Terry-type 
investigative stop by a law enforcement officer at any time without the need for any 
other justification at all." United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 543 (10th Cir. 
1994). 
10 
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Finally, the State argues that the troopers had a reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Adamson was driving without an ignition interlock device simply because 
they failed to notice whether one was installed during their first encounter. But 
that is precisely the point: Although Mr. Adamson did have an ignition interlock 
device installed, the troopers didn't notice it because, in the absence of any 
evidence of alcohol consumption or impairment, there was no reason to look for it 
in the first place. Only after discovering that Mr. Adamson had previously been 
convicted of DUI and was subject to certain license restrictions did the troopers 
inappropriately expand their investigation. Again, "[criminal history alone is 
insufficient to give rise to the necessary reasonable suspicion to shift the focus of 
a traffic stop to an investigation of criminal activity." Dennis, 2007 UT App 266, U 
12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
HI. The troopers' speculation and hunches did not amount to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. 
"Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, 
supported by specific and articulable facts." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, H 
23, 164 P.3d 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). B[T]he standard requires 
more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch." Id. (ellipsis and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, U 14, 147 P.3d 
425 ("[A]n 'inchoate and un particularized suspicion or hunch,' is insufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion." (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968))). 
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If anything was "inchoate and unparticularized," it was the troopers' 
unfounded belief that because Mr. Adamson had a criminal history, he might 
have been violating the law at the time of the stop, too. This hunch—which was 
wholly unsupported and uncorroborated by any other fact—was the sole basis for 
the troopers' terminating, or at least interrupting, their initial investigation and 
commencing a separate DUI investigation instead. Trooper McCoy's admitted 
inability to smell any odor of alcohol and his failure to observe any other signs of 
impairment, and Trooper Spillman's admission that there was no evidence to 
suggest that Mr. Adamson had even consumed any alcohol, clearly show that 
their belief was nothing more than an "inchoate and unparticularized" hunch. 
Such speculation does not amount to reasonable suspicion. Thus, the troopers' 
decision to commence a DUI investigation and inquire about the presence of the 
ignition interlock device exceeded the scope of the initial stop for minor traffic and 
equipment violations. 
IV. Troopers McCoy and Spillman exceeded the scope of the initial stop 
when they pursued a line of investigation for which there was no 
reasonable basis. 
In State v. Chapman, an officer approached a man and woman who were 
loitering in a school parking lot; they were "talking and stuff" in the back seat of the 
woman's car. See 921 P.2d at 448. The officer obtained identification from the 
woman and the name of the man, who carried no identification, and returned to his 
patrol car to run driver license and warrants checks on the man. Another officer 
12 
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heard the man's name and promptly contacted the first officer, warning him to be 
careful because the man was "an alleged gang member and was known to carry a 
gun." Id. The second officer joined the first officer at the scene, and they then 
together ordered the man out of the car and conducted a Terry frisk, finding nothing. 
When asked if he was armed, the man replied that he was not carrying a gun, but 
conceded that he did have a gun in the car. The officers then searched the car for 
the gun, and upon finding it, ran a stolen weapons check against it. The weapons 
check indicated that the gun was stolen, and the officers arrested the man. In 
suppressing the evidence because the officers exceeded the scope of the stop by 
conducting the stolen weapons check against the gun, the Utah Supreme Court said, 
"[a]fter receiving the report that [the man] was known to carry a weapon, the officer 
was certainly entitled to follow ordinary safety procedures to protect himself 
Once [the man] was outside of the vehicle and known to be unarmed, however, the 
officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion either to continue questioning him 
regarding weapons or to search for them." Id. at 453. Because the record was 
unclear as to when the man disclosed that he had a weapon in the vehicle, however, 
the supreme court explained further: 
[The officer] testified that [the man] said he had a gun inside the vehicle 
when he was initially questioned about being armed. Assuming that 
this is accurate, the officers were justified in searching for the weapon to 
insure that the weapon was not being carried illegally (i.e., loaded). 
However, once that determination was made, the officers had no 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify running a check on the 
weapon to see if the weapon had been stolen. By the officers' own 
testimony, no independent facts surrounding the encounter with [the 
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man] created suspicion that he was involved in any illegal activity 
beyond violating the loitering ordinance. Therefore, the officers 
impermissibly expanded the scope of [his] detention when they ran the 
additional check on the gun to determine its ownership. 
If we assume, for purposes of analysis, that the testimony of [the manj's 
companion is true, that [he] indicated he had no weapon when originally 
questioned by the officers but admitted to possessing a gun in the 
vehicle only after continued questioning, then even the officers' 
additional interrogation of Chapman would have been beyond the 
scope of his detention for violation of the loitering ordinance. 
Id. at 453-54 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Similarly here, Troopers McCoy and Spillman commenced a separate DUI 
investigation, beginning by inquiring about the presence of an ignition interlock 
device, without any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Adamson was in violation of 
that requirement, that he was in any way impaired, or even that he had 
consumed alcohol. There were no independent facts to justify an expansion of 
the scope of the initial detention.7 Because there was no reasonable basis to 
suspect Mr. Adamson of driving while intoxicated, or even of having consumed 
any alcohol at all, the troopers' unjustified investigation was beyond the scope of 
the initial detention for the minor traffic and equipment violations they initially 
7
 An officer who runs a license check during a traffic stop and discovers that a 
driver has a burglary conviction or a possession-of-burglary-tools conviction 
would obviously not be permitted to expand the scope of the traffic stop into a 
fishing expedition for evidence of a burglary. In the absence of specific and 
articulable facts that give rise to a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the 
scope of an initial detention may not be expanded as it was here, willy-nilly on a 
hunch. 
14 
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observed. Indeed, consistent with the analysis in Chapman, the court of appeals 
recognized in Lafond that even "[investigative questioning that further detains [a] 
driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity." 2003 UT App101, U 13. 
Because the troopers exceeded the scope of their initial detention by 
commencing a DUI investigation without any reasonable, articulable suspicion of 
criminal activity justifying that expansion, the resulting field sobriety and chemical 
test results and Mr. Adamson's statements must all be suppressed. See 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^I41-42 ("[Tjhe exclusionary rule keeps out of trial 
evidence primarily or derivatively obtained through a violation of an individual's 
constitutional rights (the 'fruit' of unconstitutional police conduct)."); State v. 
Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
•--. CONCLUSION 
The troopers' conduct in commencing a DUI investigation was illegal. 
Neither Trooper McCoy nor his trainer, Trooper Spillman, had a single shred of 
evidence that suggested that Mr. Adamson was in any way impaired, or even 
that he had consumed alcohol. Their sole basis for commencing a separate DUI 
investigation was the fact that he had a license restriction and a criminal history 
that included two prior DUI convictions. At best, it is a mere hunch that, with 
nothing whatsoever to support or corroborate it and in light of the troopers' 
admitted failure to smell any odor of alcohol or observe any other signs of 
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impairment or consumption, cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion 
justifying further investigation. Because the troopers' conduct, search, and 
seizure exceeded the scope of the initial stop and were unsupported by any 
reasonable suspicion, the results of the field sobriety and chemical tests and Mr. 
Adamson's statements, all of which were obtained because of the troopers' 
illegal conduct, must be suppressed. 
Dated this 22nd day of July, 2011. 
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, LLC 
WAIiTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
JOHN W. ANDERSON 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
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